{"id":802,"date":"2011-10-14T11:41:59","date_gmt":"2011-10-14T15:41:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.cslewis.org\/journal\/?p=802"},"modified":"2012-02-09T00:30:20","modified_gmt":"2012-02-09T04:30:20","slug":"the-human-search-for-the-good-life","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cslewis.org\/journal\/the-human-search-for-the-good-life\/","title":{"rendered":"The Human Search For the ‘Good Life’"},"content":{"rendered":"

I should start by saying that, although this philosophy symposium is about the search for meaning<\/em>, discussions which rely on the term \u201cmeaning\u201d in talking about the human search for a meaningful life seem to me to be largely modern discussions.\u00a0 I don\u2019t think you\u2019ll find historically many philosophers writing about the conditions for a \u201cmeaningful life\u201d.\u00a0 But philosophers have<\/em> talked a great deal about a \u201cgood life\u201d, and they\u2019ve offered theories as to what makes a person\u2019s life go well for that person.\u00a0 Aristotle stressed that the human exercise of our unique capacity for rationality\u2014which we use to navigate between behavioural extremes\u2014holds the key to achieving a good life.\u00a0 John Stuart Mill conceived of a good life as one which has maximized pleasure over pain.\u00a0 A popular view among philosophers today is that your life goes well for you when your desires are satisfied.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Christian tradition\u2019s understanding of a good life involves us being in loving relationships with God and with others.\u00a0 Because we are created in the image of a Trinitarian God, our lives go well for us inasmuch as our relationships mirror the self-giving relationships among the members of the Trinity.\u00a0 This account of well-being is what moral philosophers call \u201cperfectionist\u201d in nature.\u00a0 Perfectionist theories of well-being present a specified ideal for all humans; and the extent to which a person\u2019s life is a good one is the extent to which the person\u2019s life exemplifies this specified ideal.\u00a0 So, on a Christian perfectionist theory of the good life, all people\u2019s well-being ultimately rises and falls with the state of their relationships with others.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

I shall not give arguments for the plausibility of this Christian account of well-being (although I think such arguments do exist).\u00a0 Instead, I\u2019ll simply take it as a starting point.\u00a0 I want to focus on what we can do to enter into<\/em> the kinds of relationships which mirror the relationships within the Trinity, so that our lives ultimately go well for us.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Christians have always understood the kind of love exhibited by the persons of the Trinity to be a self-giving love: a love which seeks to honour and glorify the other.\u00a0 As we look to mirror these relationships, we see that Jesus indicated that \u201cno greater love has a man than this: that he lay down his life for a friend.\u201d\u00a0 And St. Paul, in writing about love, reminds us that love is not \u201cself-seeking\u201d.\u00a0 So, one way to spell out the nature of ideal relationships\u2014i.e., the ones enjoyed by the members of the Trinity and, accordingly, the ones in which we flourish\u2014is to stress how each person focuses on the other<\/em> person\u2019s well-being.\u00a0 (And if our response to God is not best understood in terms of God\u2019s well-being<\/em>, then we might talk in terms of serving God, glorifying God, honouring God, committing to God\u2019s agenda for the world.)\u00a0 On the question of how we enter<\/em> into these God-like relationships, the natural answer would seem to be that we simply focus on the welfare of others. \u00a0It\u2019s as simple as that.\u00a0 Or so I want to argue.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A good many philosophers and other writers have argued that things are not<\/em> in fact quite as simple as that.\u00a0 (And it\u2019s true that there are<\/em> innumerable details that would need to get fleshed out in terms of the relationship between others\u2019 welfare and our own.\u00a0 But I do agree with the simple thesis as a general thesis; and for the purposes of this paper, I\u2019m going to defend it in its simple form.)\u00a0 In C. S. Lewis\u2019s work The Four Loves <\/em>we find what seem to be three reasons for thinking that healthy, loving relationships are not simply a matter of each person focusing on the well-being of the other person.\u00a0 These three reasons stem from Lewis\u2019s comments on (1) Appreciative love, (2) Eros, and (3) Friendship.\u00a0 In what follows I want to argue that Lewis\u2019s possible objections to our simple thesis do not<\/em> in the end prevail.\u00a0 And instead, it is Lewis\u2019s remarks on these natural loves that need to be revised a bit.\u00a0 Specifically, I shall argue that Lewis understates the role of personal welfare<\/em> in his various discussions of the natural loves.\u00a0 I shall then suggest that, once we make the proper link between welfare and the natural loves, Lewis\u2019s key point about the supreme, Christian love of Charity<\/em> is actually strengthened.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Appreciative love: Do we focus on intrinsic qualities instead of welfare?<\/h2>\n

The first challenge from Lewis\u2019s writings comes from his description of Appreciative love, which plays a role in the three natural loves of Affection, Friendship, and (especially) Eros. \u00a0The simple thesis which I want to defend understands God-like love to be a matter of pursuing the other person\u2019s well-being.\u00a0 But Appreciative love, as Lewis describes it, is a love that does not focus on the welfare<\/em> of either ourselves or the other person.\u00a0 Rather, we love another person with an Appreciative love when we appreciate the intrinsic qualities of the person\u2014above and beyond any personal feelings or pleasures we (or they) derive from interacting with the person.\u00a0 Appreciative love, by its nature, applies equally to impersonal objects as to other people.\u00a0 Lewis says that when we appreciate other objects or people, \u201cThey make us feel that something has not merely gratified our senses in fact but claimed our appreciation by right.\u201d[1]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lewis here is challenging the thesis of Welfarism<\/em>.\u00a0 Welfarism insists that there is a conceptual connection between \u201cthe good\u201d and people\u2019s welfare.\u00a0 Something can only be good if it is good for<\/em> some person (or for some other sentient creature or divine being).\u00a0 I myself think the thesis of Welfarism has a great deal of intuitive appeal.\u00a0 If you were to recount approvingly to me how it was \u201cgood\u201d that some event occurred, but you could not identify anyone who benefited from the event, I am not sure why I should share your sense of approval that led you to call the event \u201cgood\u201d.\u00a0 Conversely, if you lamented the occurrence of a \u201cbad\u201d event, but you could not identify a single person whose flourishing was in any way diminished, I am not sure why I should think of the event as a \u201cbad\u201d thing.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

But Lewis (and a good number of other philosophers) have argued that this Welfarist intuition does not do justice to the attitudes we have toward fine art, fine music, and other things which supposedly have intrinsic value.\u00a0 Here is an example Lewis gives:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The connoisseur does not merely enjoy his claret as he might enjoy warming his feet when they were cold.\u00a0 He feels that here is a wine that deserves his full attention; that justifies all the tradition and skill that have gone to its making and all the years of training that have made his own palate fit to judge it.\u00a0 There is even a glimmering of unselfishness in his attitude\u2026.Even if he were on his death-bed and was never going to drink wine again, he would be horrified at the thought of this vintage being spilled or spoiled or even drunk by clods (like myself) who can\u2019t tell a good claret from a bad.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

And again in talking about feelings of Appreciative love,<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

It is the feeling which would make a man unwilling to deface a great picture even if he were the last man left alive and himself about to die; which makes us glad of unspoiled forests that we shall never see\u2026.We do not merely like the things; we pronounce them, in a momentarily God-like sense, \u201cvery good\u201d.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lewis is certainly correct that we appreciate the qualities in a fine wine or a fine piece of art.\u00a0 But the key question is whether these qualities have intrinsic value<\/em> which we merely recognize as \u201cvery good\u201d.\u00a0 I want to argue that these qualities are not intrinsically good, but rather are good inasmuch as they are good for<\/em> us (or for others).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Consider Lewis\u2019s example of the claret.\u00a0 Presumably, the connoisseur enjoys it because he is able to detect subtle flavours and aromas, and these sensations evoke mental images of lavender fields and hot summer breezes and whatever else connoisseurs think about when they are swishing wine around in their mouths.\u00a0 But it seems to me an entirely contingent matter that humans should be roused by such things.\u00a0 Many Americans were introduced as children to Tang<\/em>, a powder which, when mixed with water, yields a very sweet, artificially orange-flavoured drink.\u00a0 Those who are familiar both with Tang<\/em> and with expensive clarets will no doubt tend to prefer the latter.\u00a0 But what if the human senses of taste and smell were such that we could detect the subtle ingredient changes that take place among factories that manufacture Tang<\/em>?\u00a0 What if we could detect whether factories mixed ingredients in copper pots or aluminium pots?\u00a0 Gatherings of connoisseurs in high-end society might debate the merits of particular packages of Tang<\/em>.\u00a0 Although this scenario might initially seem silly, the fact is that it is an entirely contingent matter that humans should be roused more by the aromas of lavender fields and wind-swept valleys than by the aromas of copper pots and indoor factories.\u00a0 So, I do not think there is any value intrinsic<\/em> to a glass of claret which we simply recognize as good\u2014over and above the way it is good for<\/em> us in certain respects.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Perhaps the critic might still insist that some pieces of artwork and music simply contain more complexity than others.\u00a0 Mahler\u2019s second symphony, for instance, contains innumerably more chord progressions and melody motifs than does Elvis Presley\u2019s Blue Suede Shoes<\/em>.\u00a0 However, it again seems an entirely contingent matter that we should judge as especially creative the surprising chord progressions and melodic turns of Mahler\u2019s second symphony.\u00a0 It is possible to imagine creatures for whom creativity is always measured by the simplicity of artwork\u2014just as sometimes simple elegance is for us a sign of creativity.\u00a0 For this society of creatures, perhaps most everyone is capable of writing long, complex symphonies\u2014whereas only a few souls (those seen as true creative geniuses) are able to condense the complex melodies running through their heads into clear, simple tunes like Blue Suede Shoes<\/em>.\u00a0 And at any rate, there is still the question of why creativity should be seen as a good thing in the first place.\u00a0 Creative pieces of art and music inspire us, challenge us, remind us of our commitments, and so forth.\u00a0 Yet, beyond these kinds of effects which art and music have on<\/em> us<\/em>, we again come to the Welfarist intuition that there seems to be nothing left to commend them.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

We should quickly add that, when connoisseurs cultivate their appreciation for wine or artwork, they will be focusing their attention on the qualities of the wine or artwork itself.\u00a0 They will not be thinking consciously about the enjoyment they are personally receiving from their pursuits.\u00a0 But this fact does not undermine the conclusion that their own enjoyment is indeed giving rise to the favourable attitude they have toward the objects in question.\u00a0 It is a well-known phenomenon that people can often best enhance their own well-being by focusing their attention on things other<\/em> than their own well-being.\u00a0 While playing a game of basketball, I will enjoy myself if I concentrate on the game and say to myself, \u201cMake the basket; make the basket.\u201d\u00a0 By contrast, if I keep saying to myself, \u201cEnjoy the moment more; enjoy the moment more!\u201d, my experiences will not be as enjoyable.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

C. S. Lewis recognized a similar point in talking about how we enjoy gardens.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Say your prayers in a garden early, ignoring steadfastly the dew, the birds and the flowers, and you will come away overwhelmed by its freshness and joy; go there in order to be overwhelmed and, after a certain age, nine times out of ten nothing will happen to you.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

What is important for our purposes is the point that we can most enjoy a walk in the garden or a game of basketball when we\u2019re not consciously focused on the enjoyment we are drawing from it.\u00a0 At the same time, the reason<\/em> some people take walks in gardens and play basketball\u2014while others prefer different pursuits\u2014is that they enjoy<\/em> these things.\u00a0 So in the end, it again seems that what is good about garden walks or other pursuits is the effects<\/em> these things have on us, even if these pursuits affect us most when we focus on the pursuits themselves.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Appreciative love can involve the recognition that something has qualities which are instrumentally<\/em> good in that they lead to someone\u2019s enhanced welfare.\u00a0 But I think we should side with the Welfarist who insists that intrinsic goodness is confined to the well-being of people (and other creatures and divine beings) who are capable of having a welfare.\u00a0 Accordingly, we remain free to spell out the nature of moral decisions in terms of whose<\/em> welfare we seek to promote.\u00a0 This was our original, simple thesis.\u00a0 Given that Lewis does not demonstrate that intrinsic value exists apart from people\u2019s welfare, his remarks on Appreciative love do not serve to undermine our simple thesis.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Eros: Do we desire the beloved him\/herself, apart from anyone\u2019s welfare?<\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lewis\u2019s discussion of Eros provides a second possible challenge to our simple thesis that ideal, loving relationships involve each person pursuing the others\u2019 well-being as his ultimate goal.\u00a0 Eros, as Lewis describes it, does not have as its simple goal the well-being of the beloved; that goal would be more in line with Charity, which we\u2019ll discuss later.\u00a0 And Eros does not have as its goal one\u2019s own well-being.\u00a0 Lewis declares, \u201cIn some mysterious but quite indisputable fashion the lover desires the Beloved herself, not the pleasure she can give.\u201d[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

I do, however, want to dispute this idea of \u2018desiring the Beloved\u2019, as I am not sure how to make sense of it.\u00a0 Admittedly, Lewis\u2019s description of Appreciative love relies on the idea of desiring an object for its own sake.\u00a0 And Lewis does see Appreciative love as an important element within Eros.\u00a0 But Eros extends beyond Appreciative love.\u00a0 Whereas appreciative love identifies intrinsic worth in the object, Lewis describes Eros as, again, \u201cdesiring the Beloved\u201d.\u00a0 And presumably this desire is not necessarily proportionate to the intrinsic value of the qualities we identify in the Beloved.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In arguing that \u201cEros does not aim at happiness,\u201d[6]<\/a> Lewis offers the following observation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Everyone knows that it is useless to try to separate lovers by proving to them that their marriage will be an unhappy one\u2026.For it is the very mark of Eros that when he is in us we had rather share unhappiness with the Beloved than be happy on any other terms.\u00a0 Even if the two lovers are mature and experienced people who know that broken hearts heal in the end and can clearly foresee that, if they once steeled themselves to go through the present agony of parting, they would almost certainly be happier ten years hence than marriage is at all likely to make them\u2014even then, they would not part\u2026.Even when it becomes clear beyond all evasion that marriage with the Beloved cannot possibly lead to happiness\u2014when it cannot even profess to offer any other life than that of tending an incurable invalid, of hopeless poverty, of exile, or of disgrace\u2014Eros never hesitates to say, \u201cBetter this than parting.\u00a0 Better to be miserable with her than happy without her.\u201d[7]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There are a couple ways we might plausibly interpret the behaviour Lewis describes, though these ways do not serve to undermine our simple thesis about focusing on people\u2019s welfare.\u00a0 First, when Lewis talks about a life of \u201ctending an incurable invalid\u201d, we can imagine a case of altruistic love where a person sacrifices his own well-being in order to promote the well-being of the Beloved.\u00a0 But this case would be a kind of Charity; and Lewis means to distinguish Eros from Charity.\u00a0 So, this interpretation of altruism will not help Lewis make his point about \u201cdesiring the Beloved\u201d.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A second plausible interpretation of Lewis\u2019s examples also will not help him make his point.\u00a0 When Lewis talks about lovers refusing to part company, even with both of them knowing that in the long run they will both be better off if they do<\/em> part, he points to an interesting fact about human nature.\u00a0 But this fact seems to be a more general point about prudence<\/em>, rather than anything particular to love relationships where we somehow \u201cdesire the Beloved\u201d.\u00a0 It is a generally accepted fact that we are quite capable of sacrificing our perceived long-term best interests for the sake of lesser, immediate enjoyments.\u00a0 For example, flipping through the television channels late one evening, you may find a B-movie playing which you\u2019ve previously seen.\u00a0 Knowing that you must get up early for work the next morning, you recognize that, all things considered, you will be better off by going to bed immediately and getting a good night\u2019s sleep.\u00a0 And yet, you may well stay up to watch the movie, lamenting this fact both when you finally do go to bed and, especially, when your alarm clock goes off the next morning.\u00a0 Imprudence is a matter of preferring lesser, immediate well-being to greater, long-term well-being.\u00a0 And if imprudence explains why two lovers stay together while knowing that their long-term better interests lie elsewhere, then the struggle is not, as Lewis suggests, between welfare and some desire \u201cfor the Beloved\u201d.\u00a0 Rather, the struggle is between short-term well-being and greater, long-term well-being.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Once we set aside the interpretation of an altruistic desire for the Beloved\u2019s welfare, as well as the imprudent desire for one\u2019s own lesser, immediate welfare, it becomes difficult to make sense of the idea of \u201cdesiring the Beloved\u201d (beyond the idea of Appreciative love, which we critiqued in the previous section).\u00a0 So, Lewis\u2019s remarks on the nature of Eros do not, as far as I can see, give us reason to revise our simple thesis that an ideal, loving relationships exists as each person focuses on the welfare<\/em> of the other.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Friendship: Can it exist without considerations of welfare?<\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

A third challenge to our simple thesis comes from Lewis\u2019s comments on the nature of friendship.\u00a0 Specifically, Lewis describes how friendships arise: \u201cFriendship\u2026is born at the moment when one man says to another, \u2018What!\u00a0 You too?\u00a0 I thought that no one but myself\u2026\u2019\u201d[8]<\/a>\u00a0 The suggestion seems to be that we can at least begin to have friendships before even contemplating such things as whether we will promote the other person\u2019s welfare instead of our own.\u00a0 And inasmuch as friendships increase our well-being, then the implication seems to be that we can in some respects find a \u201cgood life\u201d without having to concern ourselves with questions of promoting people\u2019s interests above our own.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lewis is certainly correct in pointing out that the discovery of shared interests can have a positive impact on us.\u00a0 Indeed, there can be powerful healing qualities that come with meeting a stranger who at least understands\u2014even if he does not fully share\u2014our concerns and point of view.\u00a0 But I would suggest that the reason such experiences have a positive impact on us is that they lead us to anticipate the kind of ideal, loving relationship in which our well-being truly consists.\u00a0 The discovery itself that someone understands us is not sufficient to make our lives go better for us.\u00a0 If you were to discover that a stalker had been collecting data on the intimate details of your life, you would feel unnerved, not comforted.\u00a0 And the recognition that others share your interests, if accompanied by the knowledge that they mean to exclude you from gatherings where they pursue these interests, will be more bitter than sweet.\u00a0 Any encouragement we experience upon finding that others share our interests and pursuits is linked with our thought that they are treating us in loving, collegial ways that serve to end, not extend, our feelings of isolation.\u00a0 And our excitement upon finding a new friend involves our contemplation of future cooperative projects.\u00a0 Even within established friendships, relationships remain positive as they develop only if further discoveries about the person do not uncover areas where the other person is prepared to sacrifice our well-being to his own.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

So, the positive feelings we associate with a friendship stem from our belief that we are\u2014or will be\u2014in a relationship marked by mutual concern for the other person.\u00a0 Lewis\u2019s comments on Friendship help us see a certain context in which we can enjoy self-giving relationships.\u00a0 But his comments do not undermine our original, simple thesis that ideal relationships are indeed marked by self-giving commitments.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Charity: Strengthening the role of this supreme love<\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

Thus far I have argued that Appreciative love does not actually exist, at least as Lewis seems to view it.\u00a0 I have argued that Eros must make reference to people\u2019s well-being if it is to make sense, and that Friendship impacts us positively inasmuch as it presupposes that the other person has some commitment to our well-being.\u00a0 I want now to argue that these suggested, Welfarist revisions to Lewis\u2019s thoughts on the natural loves can serve to strengthen the central point he wants to make about the nature of Charity, the supremely Christian love.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In describing the nature of Charity, Lewis states that \u201cIn God there is\u2026only plenteousness that desires to give\u201d[9]<\/a> and that \u201cDivine Gift-love\u2026is wholly disinterested and desires what is simply best for the beloved.\u201d[10]<\/a>\u00a0 Thus far, Lewis\u2019s description of Charity seems right in line with what our original, simple thesis affirmed: God relates to others while focused on their well-being; and as creatures in the image of God, we will achieve the good life God intends for us as we do the same.\u00a0 It is Lewis\u2019s discussion of the relationship between Charity and the natural loves which proves more difficult.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lewis acknowledges how the three natural loves of Affection (which we\u2019ve not discussed), Friendship, and Eros will ultimately fail us unless they are transformed by Charity.\u00a0 He provides terrific insights into how this can happen.\u00a0 The beauty of the outdoors can \u201cdie on\u201d the lover of nature; and family Affection, Friendship, and Eros can all become twisted and self-destructive.\u00a0 These things happen, says Lewis, when they \u201cbecome gods\u201d to us\u2014that is, when we treat them like the highest ideals of love.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

To prevent these loves from being deified such that they actually become \u201cdemons\u201d for us, Lewis emphasizes that they must be transformed<\/em> by Charity.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The invitation to turn our natural loves into Charity is never lacking.\u00a0 It is provided by those frictions and frustrations that meet us in all of them; unmistakable evidence that (natural) love is not going to be \u201cenough\u201d.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lewis\u2019s phrase of \u201cturning our natural loves into Charity\u201d may lead us to think that Charity somehow replaces<\/em> the natural loves of Affection, Friendship, and Eros.\u00a0 But Lewis is clear that this is not<\/em> how we should conceive of transformation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

the Divine Love does not substitute<\/em> itself for the natural\u2014as if we had to throw away our silver to make room for the gold.\u00a0 The natural loves are summoned to become modes of Charity while also remaining the natural loves they were\u2026.As Christ is perfect God and perfect Man, the natural loves are called to become perfect Charity and also perfect natural loves.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

At this point Lewis\u2019s position becomes a bit unclear.\u00a0 It is not at all obvious how the natural loves\u2014Affection, Friendship and Eros\u2014can both\u00a0remain and<\/em> become the love of Charity.\u00a0 Either one\u2019s ultimate concern in relating to someone else is the well-being of that other person\u2014which is the hallmark of Christ-like Charity\u2014or it is not.\u00a0 If it is, then it is unclear how Lewis means for us to think of the natural loves as remaining<\/em>.\u00a0 After all, Lewis describes the natural loves as involving desires and appreciations which are not tied to anyone\u2019s well-being.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

But I have argued that the natural loves are<\/em>\u00a0in fact tied to well-being.\u00a0 Whether it is Appreciative love, Eros, or Friendship, I have argued that the attractions and value placements inherent in the natural loves are ultimately rooted in the thought that someone\u2019s welfare is enhanced.\u00a0 My suggestion now is that we should view the natural loves as leading strings of Divine grace which provide us with motivations<\/em> to pursue other people\u2019s well-being.\u00a0 (Similarly, moral reasoning can provide an impetus for personalities like Immanuel Kant to promote other people\u2019s well-being.)\u00a0 Whereas the natural loves serve as types of motivation<\/em>, Charity is not so much a kind of motivation as a Christ-like goal<\/em>: namely, the goal that other people\u2019s lives go well for them.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Our original, simple thesis was that ideal, Christ-like relationships are established when each person seeks to promote the other person\u2019s welfare.\u00a0 This is the goal of Charity.\u00a0 A goal, of course, can be pursued for different reasons.\u00a0 The natural loves provide differently nuanced motivations to pursue this single, Christ-like goal of Charity.\u00a0 This understanding of the relationship between Charity and the natural loves would allow Lewis quite easily to explain how Charity reigns supreme in the life of the maturing Christian, even though the natural loves are not so much replaced <\/em>by Charity as they are transformed<\/em> by Charity.\u00a0 They are transformed in the sense that they serve as motivation in the life of the Christian to perform acts of service for the sake of others, instead of serving as motivations to pursue selfish ends by the person who places his own well-being above others.\u00a0 The motivations associated with the natural loves are given to all of us by God.\u00a0 How we use them depends on whose interests we choose to focus on.\u00a0 Of course the great paradox of the Christian faith is that, when we \u201close our life\u201d in self-giving focus on God and others, we find that our own well-being has indeed increased.\u00a0 (We discussed earlier how we can often increase our well-being by focusing on things other<\/em> than our well-being.)<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In summary, my suggestion in our earlier discussions of the natural loves was that Lewis understates how the feelings we associate with Appreciative love, Eros, and Friendship involve considerations of someone\u2019s welfare.\u00a0 And with a more Welfarist understanding of the natural loves, we can see them as divine leading strings, as motivations, which prompt us to join God in the charitable pursuit of others\u2019 well-being, thereby attaining the \u201cgood life\u201d God has designed for us.<\/p>\n

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 <\/p>\n

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[1]<\/a> 18.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[2]<\/a> 18.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[3]<\/a> 20.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[4]<\/a> 25.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[5]<\/a> 88.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[6]<\/a> 98.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[7]<\/a> 98-99.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[8]<\/a> 74.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[9]<\/a> 116.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[10]<\/a> 117.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[11]<\/a> 123.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[12]<\/a> 122.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I should start by saying that, although this philosophy symposium is about the search for meaning, discussions which rely on the term \u201cmeaning\u201d in talking about the human search for a meaningful life seem to me to be largely modern…<\/p>\n

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